How to Build a FreeBSD-STABLE Firewall with IPFILTER
Applicable to: FreeBSD 4.3
Updated: April 29, 2001
Author: Marty Schlacter
Source URL: http://www.schlacter.dyndns.org/public/FreeBSD-STABLE_and_IPFILTER.html
If you have any suggested changes or corrections to this document, please e-mail me with those changes/corrections.
This howto walks
you through the process of building one of the most stable and secure firewalls
available - a FreeBSD-STABLE firewall with IPFILTER. As a part of the
installation process, all services will be disabled except OpenSSH, which will
have its access controlled via TCP-Wrappers. The firewall will be configured to
log through the syslog facility, but will have its own firewall log files
(rather than filling up /var/log/messages). We'll add VESA support into the
kernel so that we can use 132x43 screen resolutions, as well as compile support
into the kernel for a second ISA Ethernet card if you have one. After we add a
warning banner to the system, we'll make BASH the default shell for root,
perform a rudimentary setup for root's BASH environment, and redirect root's
email to your "normal" account so that the root account on the firewall itself
doesn't fill up. Next, we'll download, compile, install, and configure
Tripwire, as well as install cvsup so that your ports collection stays up to
date. And, lastly, we'll modify the /etc/fstab entries so that some of your
partitions are mounted 'nosuid', 'noexec', or 'ro' so that your installation
is as secure as possible.
This is an all-encompassing how-to, and should take 1/2 of a Saturday to
complete, but when you're finished, you'll not only have a great firewall, but
will be better able to compare and contrast FreeBSD/IPFILTER to
Linux2.4/IPTABLES so that you can consider the pros/cons of each on their
merits...and that learning process is what all of this about anyway. So, grab a
cup of coffee, sit down with that old Pentium, and get ready to broaden your
horizons.
Before we start, I'd like to thank Dan O'Connor for the work he put in on his
great site, FreeBSD Cheat
Sheets, since it was his great site that gave me the motivation to start
this howto. You will undoubtedly see some of his tips and tricks sprinkled
throughout this document. For those of you that are new to FreeBSD, I highly recommend his site.
In addition, there have been several other people on the Internet who have
given me great suggestions & and feedback on this HOWTO. The majority (if not
all) of their comments have been incporporated into this document in some form
or another. There are too many to list here by name, but (rest assured) the
Open Source community has helped to make this the best document it can be.
And, as always, before performing this procedure, I highly recommend that you
review the Installing FreeBSD
chapter of the FreeBSD Handbook.
Network Schematic & System Configuration The intent of this document is to show you how to build a firewall for your home network.
Just to make sure that we're "working off the same sheet of music" here's a quick
ASCII-schematic of what our notional home network will look like - to include device names
for the Ethernet interfaces. In addition, I'm including a quick synopsis of the configuration
of my own hardware - so that you can use it as a reference point throughout this procedure.
Installing FreeBSD-STABLE To build the most stable and security-patched system you can, you'll want
to make sure you're running the latest version of FreeBSD-STABLE. When I built
my last system, the April 28, 2001 version of FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE
was the latest version released.
For those of you new to FreeBSD, the STABLE
branch is the version of the operating system that has all of the latest
patches, bugfixes, and enhancements after the previous release was made. If
you've installed FreeBSD-4.3 from CD-ROM (either one that your purchased or
'burned' from a downloaded ISO image), you probably installed 4.3-RELEASE,
which is (simplistically) nothing more than a version of the 4.3 branch
that was exhaustively tested, burned to CD-ROM and made available for
sale. After the release date of 4.3-RELEASE (on April 20, 2001), the
4.3 tree continued to evolve & be patched (for security reasons) after that
point. Since there's no way the folks at FreeBSD.org can burn & sell
CD-ROMs for each day's version of the 4.3 tree, 4.3-RELEASE is the only one
made available for sale on CD, and subsequent snapshots of the 4.3 tree are
only available on-line and are labelled '4.3-STABLE'. Once 4.3-STABLE is
sufficiently enhanced/patched (perhaps 4 months later), the code enters a
freeze and will officially become the 'RELEASE' version of the next FreeBSD
release. If you're installing FreeBSD 4.3 well after the release date,
you will definitely want to install 4.3-STABLE, not 4.3-RELEASE.
So, what are the benefits of loading 4.3-STABLE rather than 4.3-RELEASE?
Well, the biggest answer
(if you're building a firewall, like we are here) is that all of the security
patches have been applied to the O/S and the associated applications. To
use the prior baseline of FreeBSD (4.2) as an example, FreeBSD-4.2-RELEASE
(which was released in November 2000) uses OpenSSH-2.2.0, which is a great
product but also has a remote buffer overflow that wasn't
discovered until early February, 2001. If a hacker exploited this
vulnerability on your 4.2-RELEASE box, they would gain remote root access
and ruin your day.
The relevant info on this vulnerability can be found on SecurityFocus' website.
When you loaded FreeBSD-4.2-STABLE (if you were following this HOWTO in
mid-March of 2001), by comparison, you would have gotten FreeBSD-4.2-RELEASE
with all of the patches applied after the November 2000 release...so your
system would have OpenSSH-2.3.0 (not OpenSSH-2.2.0) which is not vulnerable to
the remote buffer overflow.
So loading the latest snapshot from the STABLE branch saves you a lot of time
associated with loading security-related patches after your OS load is
finished.
Note: If you have PCI-based Ethernet cards, you can delete all of the
network cards in the list - yours will be found and configured
automatically. If you're on the other end of the scale (like me) and you
have two old NE2000-compliant ISA network cards, you'll only be able to
configure one of them at this time (ed0). After your installation is
complete, you'll have to build a custom kernel & add in a "placeholder"
for the 2nd generic ISA card, and then run through the kernel configuration
utility again after you reboot. We'll do this at the end of this document. Hit 'Q' then 'Y' to save your changes and exit. (System Installs...If releng4.freebsd.org isn't heavily loaded, the
install can take as little as 22 minutes (with a cable modem). If
releng4.freebsd.org is heavily loaded, the install can take as long as
2 hours...or longer...) Then tab over and select "Install", select "OK" to confirm your choices
(Packages are installed...takes about 60 seconds) Then select Exit and return to the previous menu, and then tab over and
select "Exit Install" (System reboots...) Compiling IPFILTER into the Kernel, & Configuring the
System Now that you have FreeBSD-STABLE installed on the system, we need to spend
about 2-3 hours adding in IPFILTER support as well as finishing the rest of the
configuration. Here's what we're going to do in this section (in no
particular order):
In order to save time, I'm going to do some steps in what will appear to
be an "out of order" sequence. This is being done on purpose so that we
will minimize the number of re-boots you'll have to do. In fact, the goal
is to configure the system, then recompile the kernel, and when the system
reboots, you're done. That's it.
Source URL: http://www.schlacter.dyndns.org/public/FreeBSD-STABLE_and_IPFILTER.html
Notional Network Schematic Machine Configuration
-------------------------- ---------------------
ISP / Internet - 200MHz Pentium-MMX (overclocked to 225MHz)
(UNTRUSTED) - 96MB EDO RAM
| - 4GB UDMA/33 hard drive
| - 2-button serial mouse
--------- - S3 Virge/DX (4MB)
| Cable | - NE2000-compatible ISA Ethernet card (generic)
| Modem | - no CD-ROM drive
---------
|
|
ed0 |
---------------
| xx.xx.xx.xx |
| |
| FreeBSD |
| Firewall |
| |
| 192.168.1.1 |
---------------
ed1 |
|
|
-----------
| 10BaseT |
| Hub |
-----------
| | | | |
| | | | |
Internal Network
(TRUSTED)
[root@yoursys /tmp]# dd
if=/tmp/kern.flp of=/dev/fd0
2880+1 records in
2880+0 records
out
1474560 bytes transferred in 49.931306 secs (30135 bytes/sec)
C:\WINDOWS\TEMP>rawrite
RaWrite 1.3 - Write disk file to raw
floppy diskette
Enter source file name: mfsroot.flp
Enter
destination drive: a:
Please insert a formatted diskette into drive A:
and press -ENTER- :
Number of sectors per track for this disk is
18
Writing image to drive A:. Press ^C to abort.
Track: 79 Head: 1
Sector: 16
Done.
Storage:
ATA/ATAPI compatible
disk controller
ata0
14
0x1f0
ATA/ATAPI compatible
disk controller
ata1
15
0x170
Floppy disk
controller
fdc0
6
0x3f0
Networks:
NE1000,NE2000,3C503,WD/SMC80xx Ethernet
adapters
ed0
10
0x280
Communications:
Parallel Port
chipset
ppc0
7
8250/16450/16550
Serial port
sio0
4
0x3f8
8250/16450/16550
Serial port
sio1
3
0x2f8
Input:
Keyboard
atkbd0
1
Syscons console
driver
sc0
Multimedia:
Miscellaneous:
Math
coprocessor
npx0
13
0xf0
256MB swap partition (or at least 2x your RAM)
Here's a partition scheme if you only have one of those old 1.1 GB drives.
I haven't tried to install it on a drive this small, but based on the
partition usage after you've completed this HOWTO, these numbers look about
right. The only thing that might make it not work is if a whole bunch of
temp files are created during the kernel compilation process (which would
subsequently fill up /tmp and cause the compile to abort, etc.).
So, 'caveat emptor' on the 1.1 GB configuration. If you're able to make it
work on a drive this small, please email me
& I'll update the HOWTO.
128MB file system mounted as /
512MB file system mounted as /tmp
512MB file system mounted as /var
1,000MB file system mounted as /usr
640MB file system mounted as /usr/local
1,000MB file system mounted as /usr/home
128MB swap partition
128MB file system mounted as /
64MB file system mounted as /tmp
64MB file system mounted as /var
640MB file system mounted as /usr
64MB file system mounted as /usr/local
32MB file system mounted as /usr/home
Type: Auto
Port: COM1
Flags:
-3 WWW - lynx-2.8.3.1
Mail - mutt-1.2.5
Net - cvsup-bin-16.1
Shells - bash-2.0.5 Networking:
- Disable "inetd - This machine wants to run the inet daemon"
- Enable "ntpdate - Select a clock-synchronization server"
- Disable "portmap - This machine wants to run the portmapper daemon"
- Disable "sendmail - This machine wants to run the sendmail daemon"
umask 077
PS1="[\u@\h \W]\\$ "
alias ls='ls -alFG'
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:$HOME/bin;
export PATH
umask 077
PS1="[\u@\h \W]\\$ "
alias ls='ls -alFG'
THIS SYSTEM IS RESTRICTED TO AUTHORIZED USERS FOR AUTHORIZED
USE
ONLY. UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED AND MAY BE
PUNISHABLE UNDER THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT OF 1986 OR
OTHER
APPLICABLE LAWS. IF NOT AUTHORIZED TO ACCESS THIS SYSTEM,
DISCONNECT NOW.
BY CONTINUING, YOU CONSENT TO YOUR KEYSTROKES
AND DATA CONTENT BEING
MONITORED. ALL PERSONS ARE HEREBY
NOTIFIED THAT THE USE OF THIS SYSTEM
CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO
MONITORING AND AUDITING.
* * * * * * * * * *
* * W A R N I N G * * * * * * * * * * * * *[root@numa /root]# cp
/usr/share/examples/cvsup/stable-supfile /etc
[root@numa /root]# vi
/etc/stable-supfile
[root@numa /root]# cvsup /etc/stable-supfile
- Change line 66 of the file so that it points cvsup to a CVS server near you. I change mine to read '*default host=cvsup2.FreeBSD.org'
- Add these lines at the bottom of the file:
ports-www tag=.
ports-mail tag=.
ports-net tag=.
ports-shells tag=.
ports-security tag=.
ports-sysutils tag=.
- ...and other lines for ports collections you want...
ftp stream tcp nowait
root /usr/libexec/ftpd ftpd
-l
telnet stream tcp nowait
root /usr/libexec/telnetd
telnetd
comsat dgram udp wait tty:tty
/usr/libexec/comsat
comsat
ntalk dgram udp wait tty:tty
/usr/libexec/ntalkd
ntalkd
ftp stream tcp6
nowait root /usr/libexec/ftpd ftpd
-l
telnet stream tcp6 nowait
root /usr/libexec/telnetd telnetd
# This is ssh server systemwide configuration file.
#
# $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/sshd_config,v 1.4.2.5 2001/01/18 22:36:53 green Exp $
Port 22
Protocol 2
#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
#ListenAddress ::
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key *** Delete this line ***
HostDsaKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
ServerKeyBits 768
LoginGraceTime 120
KeyRegenerationInterval 3600
PermitRootLogin no
# ConnectionsPerPeriod has been deprecated completely
# After 10 unauthenticated connections, refuse 30% of the new ones, and
# refuse any more than 60 total.
MaxStartups 10:30:60
# Don't read ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
IgnoreRhosts yes
# Uncomment if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for RhostsRSAAuthentication
#IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes
StrictModes yes
X11Forwarding no
X11DisplayOffset 10
PrintMotd yes
KeepAlive yes
# Logging
SyslogFacility AUTH
LogLevel DEBUG
#obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
RhostsAuthentication no
#
# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh_known_hosts
RhostsRSAAuthentication no
#
RSAAuthentication yes
# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
PasswordAuthentication no
PermitEmptyPasswords no
# Uncomment to disable s/key passwords
#SkeyAuthentication no
#KbdInteractiveAuthentication yes
# To change Kerberos options
#KerberosAuthentication no
#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
#AFSTokenPassing no
#KerberosTicketCleanup no
# Kerberos TGT Passing does only work with the AFS kaserver
#KerberosTgtPassing yes
CheckMail yes
#UseLogin no
# Uncomment if you want to enable sftp
#Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
[root@numa /root]# su - testuser *** substituted your non-privileged userid for 'testuser'
[testuser@numa testuser]$ ssh-keygen -d *** then accept the default DSA key name & enter a passphrase (twice)
[testuser@numa testuser]$ cd .ssh
[testuser@numa .ssh]$ cat id_dsa.pub > authorized_keys2
#
# hosts.allow access control
file for "tcp wrapped" applications.
#
ALL : localhost 127.0.0.1 :
allow
sshd : 192.168.1.0/255.255.255.0 : allow
ALL : ALL : deny
[root@numa /root]# cd
/usr/ports/devel/gmake
[root@numa gmake]# make && make install
[root@numa gmake]# cd
/root
[root@numa /root]# lynx http://download.sourceforge.net/tripwire
[root@numa /root]# tar zxvf tripwire-2.3.1-2.tar.gz
- Use the down-arrow to move through the hyperlinks until
the file, tripwire-2.3.1-2.tar.gz, is highlighted, then press
[Enter]
- When asked if you want to D)ownload the file, or C)ancel,
hit 'd'
- ...file downloads...
- After the file downloads,
you'll be presented with lynx's Download Options screen. The 'Save to
disk' hyperlink is automatically highlighted in red, so just hit
[Enter].
- Either accept the original filename by pressing [Enter],
or modify the filename then hit [Enter] to save it.
- After the
file is saved, press 'q' to quit lynx.
[root@numa /root]# cd
tripwire-2.3.1-2/src
[root@numa src]# vi Makefile
- Add a comment at the beginning of line 82 (SYSPRE =
i686-pc-linux)
- Remove the '#' comment delimeter at the beginning
of line 84 (SYSPRE = i386-unknown-freebsd)
- Save and exit.
[root@numa src]# gmake release
[root@numa src]# cd
../install/
[root@numa install]# vi install.cfg
- Change line 27 so that it reads 'TWBIN="/usr/local/sbin"'
- Change line 33 so that it reads 'TWMAN="/usr/share/man"'
- Change line 39 so that it reads 'TWDOCS="/usr/share/doc/tripwire"'
- Change line 51 so that it reads 'TWEDITOR="/usr/bin/vi"'
- Change line 88 so that it reads 'TWMAILPROGRAM="/usr/sbin/sendmail -oi -t"'
- Save and exit. [root@numa install]# vi
install.sh
- Change line 319 so that it reads
'EULA_PATH="../$TWLICENSEFILE"'
- Change line 491 so that it
reads 'BIN_DIR="../bin/i386-unknown-freebsd_r"'
- Change lines
621-638 so that they read as
follows:
f1=' ff=$README ; d="/.." ;
dd=$TWDOCS ; rr=0444 '
f2=' ff=$REL_NOTES
; d="/.." ; dd=$TWDOCS ; rr=0444 '
f3='
ff=$TWLICENSEFILE ; d="/.." ; dd=$TWDOCS ; rr=0444
'
f4=' ff=tripwire ;
d="/../bin/i386-unknown-freebsd_r" ; dd=$TWBIN ; rr=0550
'
f5=' ff=twadmin ;
d="/../bin/i386-unknown-freebsd_r" ; dd=$TWBIN ; rr=0550
'
f6=' ff=twprint ;
d="/../bin/i386-unknown-freebsd_r" ; dd=$TWBIN ; rr=0550
'
f7=' ff=siggen ;
d="/../bin/i386-unknown-freebsd_r" ; dd=$TWBIN ; rr=0550
'
f8=' ff=TRADEMARK ; d="/.." ;
dd=$TWDOCS ; rr=0444 '
f9='
ff=policyguide.txt ; d="/../policy" ; dd=$TWDOCS ; rr=0444
'
f10=' ff=twpol.txt ; d="/../policy" ;
dd=$TWPOLICY ; rr=0640 '
f11='
ff=twpolicy.4 ; d="/../man/man4" ; dd=$TWMAN/man4 ; rr=0444
'
f12=' ff=twconfig.4 ; d="/../man/man4"
; dd=$TWMAN/man4 ; rr=0444 '
f13='
ff=twfiles.5 ; d="/../man/man5" ; dd=$TWMAN/man5 ; rr=0444
'
f14=' ff=siggen.8 ; d="/../man/man8" ;
dd=$TWMAN/man8 ; rr=0444 '
f15='
ff=tripwire.8 ; d="/../man/man8" ; dd=$TWMAN/man8 ; rr=0444
'
f16=' ff=twadmin.8 ; d="/../man/man8" ;
dd=$TWMAN/man8 ; rr=0444 '
f17='
ff=twintro.8 ; d="/../man/man8" ; dd=$TWMAN/man8 ; rr=0444
'
f18=' ff=twprint.8 ; d="/../man/man8" ;
dd=$TWMAN/man8 ; rr=0444 '
- Save and exit.
[root@numa install]#
./install.sh
- Answer 'y' to continue with the installation
-
Press [Enter] to view the license agreement...when complete, type
'accept' and [Enter]
- The install script will verify that
sendmail and vi are installed, then verify that the tripwire
binaries are available, and then echo back all of the configuration
parameters for the installation script (e.g. TWBIN, TWMAN, etc.). If
everything looks good, answer 'y' to continue with the
installation.
- The install script copies all of the files, the
asks you to enter a new site keyfile passphrase. Enter it, and then
enter it again when asked to verify it.
- The install script then
asks you to enter a new local keyfile passphrase. Enter it, and then
enter it again when asked to verify it.
- The install script will
then create a signed configuration file, but will need you to enter
the site passphrase you just set, above. Enter it.
- The install
script will then create a signed policy file, but will need you to
enter the site passphrase you just set, above. Enter it.
-
...installation is complete.
@@section
GLOBAL
TWROOT="/usr/local";
TWBIN="/usr/local/sbin";
TWPOL="/etc/tripwire";
TWDB="/var/lib/tripwire";
TWSKEY="/etc/tripwire";
TWLKEY="/etc/tripwire";
TWREPORT="/var/lib/tripwire/report";
HOSTNAME=hostname.domain;
@@section
FS
SEC_CRIT = $(IgnoreNone)-SHa; # Critical files - we can't afford to
miss any changes.
SEC_SUID = $(IgnoreNone)-SHa; # Binaries with the
SUID or SGID flags set.
SEC_TCB = $(ReadOnly); # Members of the Trusted
Computing Base.
SEC_BIN = $(ReadOnly); # Binaries that shouldn't
change
SEC_CONFIG = $(Dynamic); # Config files that are changed
infrequently but accessed often.
SEC_LOG = $(Growing); # Files that
grow, but that should never change ownership.
SEC_INVARIANT = +pug; #
Directories that should never change permission or ownership.
SIG_LOW =
33; # Non-critical files that are of minimal security impact
SIG_MED =
66; # Non-critical files that are of significant security impact
SIG_HI
= 100; # Critical files that are significant points of
vulnerability
# Tripwire Binaries
(rulename = "Tripwire
Binaries", severity = $(SIG_HI))
{
$(TWBIN)/siggen ->
$(SEC_TCB);
$(TWBIN)/tripwire ->
$(SEC_TCB);
$(TWBIN)/twadmin ->
$(SEC_TCB);
$(TWBIN)/twprint ->
$(SEC_TCB);
}
# Tripwire Data Files - Configuration Files,
Policy Files, Keys, Reports, Databases
(rulename = "Tripwire Data
Files", severity = $(SIG_HI))
{
# NOTE: Removing the
inode attribute because when Tripwire creates a backup
# it
does so by renaming the old file and creating a new one (which
will
# have a new inode number). Leaving inode turned on
for keys, which shouldn't
# ever
change.
# NOTE: this rule will trigger on the first
integrity check after database
# initialization, and each
integrity check afterward until a database update
# is
run, since the database file will not exist before that
point.
$(TWDB) -> $(SEC_CONFIG)
-i;
$(TWPOL)/tw.pol -> $(SEC_BIN)
-i;
$(TWPOL)/tw.cfg -> $(SEC_BIN)
-i;
$(TWLKEY)/$(HOSTNAME)-local.key ->
$(SEC_BIN);
$(TWSKEY)/site.key ->
$(SEC_BIN);
#don't scan the individual
reports
$(TWREPORT) -> $(SEC_CONFIG) (recurse=0);
}
# These files are critical to a correct system
boot.
(rulename = "Critical system boot files", severity =
100)
{
/boot -> $(SEC_CRIT);
/kernel
-> $(SEC_CRIT);
}
# These files change the behavior of the
root account and also the authorized_keys2
# file for the user we created earlier
(rulename = "Root config files", severity =
100)
{
/root ->
$(SEC_CRIT);
/root/.bash_history ->
$(SEC_LOG);
/root/.bash_profile ->
$(SEC_CRIT);
/root/.bashrc ->
$(SEC_CRIT);
/home/username/.ssh/authorized_keys2 -> $(SEC_CRIT);
}
# Commonly accessed directories that should
remain static with regards to owner and group
(rulename = "Invariant
Directories", severity = $(SIG_MED))
{
/ ->
$(SEC_INVARIANT) (recurse = 0);
/etc -> $(SEC_INVARIANT)
(recurse = 0);
/usr/local/etc -> $(SEC_INVARIANT)
(recurse = 0);
}
(rulename = "Shell Binaries", severity =
$(SIG_HI))
{
/usr/local/bin/bash ->
$(SEC_BIN);
/bin/csh ->
$(SEC_BIN);
/bin/sh ->
$(SEC_BIN);
/bin/tcsh -> $(SEC_BIN);
}
# Rest
of critical system binaries
(rulename = "OS executables and libraries",
severity = $(SIG_HI))
{
/bin -> $(SEC_BIN) (recurse =
1);
/usr/bin -> $(SEC_BIN) (recurse =
1);
/usr/lib -> $(SEC_BIN) (recurse =
1);
/sbin -> $(SEC_BIN) (recurse =
1);
/usr/sbin -> $(SEC_BIN) (recurse = 1);
}
#
Local files
(rulename = "User executables and libraries", severity =
$(SIG_MED))
{
/usr/local/bin -> $(SEC_BIN) (recurse =
1);
/usr/local/sbin -> $(SEC_BIN) (recurse =
1);
}
# Temporary directories
(rulename = "Temporary
directories", recurse = false, severity =
$(SIG_LOW))
{
/usr/tmp ->
$(SEC_INVARIANT);
/var/tmp ->
$(SEC_INVARIANT);
/tmp ->
$(SEC_INVARIANT);
}
# Include
(rulename = "OS Development
Files", severity = $(SIG_MED))
{
/usr/include ->
$(SEC_BIN);
/usr/local/include ->
$(SEC_BIN);
}
# Shared
(rulename = "OS Shared Files",
severity = $(SIG_MED))
{
/usr/share ->
$(SEC_BIN);
!/usr/share/man;
/usr/local/share
-> $(SEC_BIN);
}
# setuid/setgid root programs
(rulename =
"setuid/setgid", severity = $(SIG_HI))
{
/bin/df ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/bin/rcp ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/sbin/ccdconfig ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/sbin/dmesg ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/sbin/dump ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/sbin/ping ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/sbin/ping6 ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/sbin/rdump ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/sbin/restore ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/sbin/route ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/sbin/rrestore ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/sbin/shutdown ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/at ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/atq ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/atrm ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/batch ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/chfn ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/chpass ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/chsh ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/crontab ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/cu ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/fstat ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/ipcs ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/keyinfo ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/keyinit ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/lock ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/login ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/lpq ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/lpr ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/lprm ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/man ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/netstat ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/nfsstat ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/passwd ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/quota ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/rlogin ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/rsh ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/su ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/systat ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/top ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/uucp ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/uuname ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/uustat ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/uux ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/vmstat ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/wall ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/write ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/ypchfn ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/ypchpass ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/ypchsh ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/bin/yppasswd ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/libexec/sendmail/sendmail ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/libexec/uucp/uucico ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/libexec/uucp/uuxqt ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/local/bin/mutt_dotlock ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/ifmcstat ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/iostat ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/lpc ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/mrinfo ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/mtrace ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/ppp ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/pppd ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/pstat ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/sliplogin ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/swapinfo ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/timedc ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/traceroute ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/traceroute6 ->
$(SEC_SUID);
/usr/sbin/trpt ->
$(SEC_SUID);
}
(rulename = "Configuration Files", severity =
$(SIG_MED))
{
/etc/hosts ->
$(SEC_CONFIG);
/etc/inetd.conf ->
$(SEC_CONFIG);
/etc/resolv.conf ->
$(SEC_CONFIG);
/etc/syslog.conf ->
$(SEC_CONFIG);
/etc/newsyslog.conf ->
$(SEC_CONFIG);
}
(rulename = "Security Control", severity =
$(SIG_HI))
{
/etc/group ->
$(SEC_CRIT);
/etc/security/ ->
$(SEC_CRIT);
}
(rulename = "Login Scripts", severity =
$(SIG_HI))
{
/etc/csh.login ->
$(SEC_CONFIG);
/etc/csh.logout ->
$(SEC_CONFIG);
/etc/csh.cshrc ->
$(SEC_CONFIG);
/etc/profile ->
$(SEC_CONFIG);
}
# These files change every time the system
boots
(rulename = "System boot changes", severity =
$(SIG_HI))
{
/dev/log ->
$(Dynamic);
/dev/cuaa0 ->
$(Dynamic);
/dev/console ->
$(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyv0 -> $(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyv1 -> $(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyv2
-> $(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyv3 ->
$(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyv4 ->
$(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyv5 ->
$(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyv6 ->
$(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyp0 -> $(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyp1 -> $(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyp2
-> $(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyp3 ->
$(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyp4 ->
$(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyp5 ->
$(Dynamic);
/dev/ttyp6 ->
$(Dynamic);
/dev/urandom ->
$(Dynamic);
/var/run ->
$(Dynamic);
/var/log -> $(Dynamic);
}
#
Critical configuration files
(rulename = "Critical configuration
files", severity = $(SIG_HI))
{
/etc/crontab ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/periodic/daily ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/periodic/weekly ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/periodic/monthly ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/defaults ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/fstab ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/hosts.allow ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/ttys ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/gettytab ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/protocols ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/services ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.conf ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.atm ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.devfs ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.diskless1 ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.diskless2 ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.firewall ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.firewall6 ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.i386 ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.isdn ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.network ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.network6 ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.pccard ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.resume ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.serial ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.shutdown ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.suspend ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.syscons ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rc.sysctl ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/motd ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/passwd ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/master.passwd ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/pwd.db ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/spwd.db ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/rpc ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/shells ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/ipf.rules ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/ipnat.rules ->
$(ReadOnly);
/etc/ssh/sshd_config ->
$(ReadOnly);
}
# Critical devices
(rulename = "Critical
devices", severity = $(SIG_HI), recurse =
false)
{
/dev/kmem ->
$(Device);
/dev/mem ->
$(Device);
/dev/null ->
$(Device);
/dev/zero ->
$(Device);
}
[root@numa /root]# twadmin --create-polfile --cfgfile /etc/tripwire/tw.cfg /etc/tripwire/twpol.txt
[root@numa /root]# tripwire --init --cfgfile /etc/tripwire/tw.cfg
*** Note: You will receive an error that says that two files do
not exist yet. These two files are /etc/ipf.rules and /etc/ipnat.rules.
That's OK because we haven't created them yet. We won't until another
5-10 steps from now. After you have completed this HOWTO, simply
re-initialize the tripwire database & everything will be OK.
[root@numa /root]# cd
/etc
[root@numa /etc]# vi crontab
- Add the following line to the file:
0 4 * * *
root /usr/local/sbin/tripwire
--check --cfgfile /etc/tripwire/tw.cfg[root@numa /root]# tripwire
--check --interactive --cfgfile /etc/tripwire/tw.cfg
font8x8="/usr/share/syscons/fonts/iso02-8x8.fnt"
allscreens_flags="132x43"syslogd_flags="-ss"
sshd_flags="-4"
ipfilter_enable="YES"
ipmon_enable="YES"
ipmon_flags="-Dsvn"
ipnat_enable="YES"
network_interfaces="ed0 ed1 lo0"
ifconfig_ed1="inet 192.168.1.1
netmask 255.255.255.0"
[root@numa /root]# touch /var/log/firewall_logs
[root@numa /root]# touch /var/log/authlog
[root@numa /root]# chmod 600 /var/log/firewall_logs
[root@numa /root]# chmod 600 /var/log/authlog
local0.* /var/log/firewall_logs
Modify the following line (at about line 14) and add the 'local0.none'
part to it (like I have it, below):
*.notice;news.err;local0.none root
auth.*
/var/log/authlog
/var/log/firewall_logs 600 5 100 * Z
/var/log/authlog 600 5 100 * Z
For those new to
egress filtering...all it means is that you only allow out of your network
traffic that you explicitly want to let out. For example, you'd change the line that
allows unrestricted outbound tcp traffic (the first rule in the ruleset)
into 5 or more different rules. One which allows outbound traffic as long as it's
going to port 80 (http). The second allows outbound traffic as long as it's
going to port 25 (smtp), etc. Add as many rules as you need to define the
outbound traffic that you're allowing. Then, add a rule before all of
these that blocks all outbound traffic to broadcast addresses (i.e. anything
that ends with a 255...like x.x.x.255). And you'd add another rule that
blocks all outbound traffic if the source address isn't on the 192.168.1.0
network or the IP address of your ed0 interface (the one that's connected
to your ISP). So, you'd be blocking all packets that aren't coming from
your network or your own system. In other words, you know that your
users will only need to go out to web sites, send mail, etc. And they'll
never need to send broadcast packets out to the Internet, etc. And they
better not be spoofing their source IP address. This is
only a sample of what
egress filtering is all about. Good (read as 'restrictive') egress
filtering
can be quite complex, but is in the best interest of the Internet because
it doesn't allow your box (in the off-chance that it does get hacked) to
be used maliciously for things like "smurf" attacks and other broadcast
amplification attacks (where your system sends out broadcast packets to a
target network to get as many systems to respond as possible...which eats up their
bandwidth). In addition, it lets you know if you have any
systems on the inside of your network that are trying to access the internet
over unauthorized protocols & services (read as "misbehaving users...").
And as a final note,
since we're using IPFILTER's stateful packet inspection abilities, we don't
need to reject traffic spoofing non-routable or reserved addresses...they'll
be blocked automatically since they don't match a corresponding packet in
the state table. If you do allow certain services into your firewall (say,
SSH access from the Internet so that you can manage the firewall remotely),
then you'll have to add these filters in. To do so, block all incoming
traffic on your ed0 interface that claims to have a source IP address of 192.168.0.0/16,
10.0.0.0/8, or any of the other reserved addresses, etc.
Use this IPFILTER ruleset as a starting point. After you
have everything running, add in whatever you want (egress filtering,
protection from non-routable addresses, IP spoofing protection, etc.) to
complete the job. This is only a starting point.
#################################################################
#
Outside Interface
#################################################################
#----------------------------------------------------------------
#
Allow out all TCP, UDP, and ICMP traffic & keep state on it
# so
that it's allowed back
in.
#----------------------------------------------------------------
pass
out quick on ed0 proto tcp from any to any keep state
pass out quick on
ed0 proto udp from any to any keep state
pass out quick on ed0 proto
icmp from any to any keep state
block out quick on ed0
all
#----------------------------------------------------------------
#
Allow bootp traffic in from your ISP's DHCP server only.
# Replace
X.X.X.X/32 with your ISP's DHCP server
address.
#----------------------------------------------------------------
pass
in quick on ed0 proto udp from X.X.X.X/32 to any port = 68 keep
state
#----------------------------------------------------------------
#
Block and log all remaining traffic coming into the firewall
# - Block
TCP with a RST (to make it appear as if the service
# isn't
listening)
# - Block UDP with an ICMP Port Unreachable (to make it
appear
# as if the service isn't listening)
# - Block all remaining
traffic the good 'ol fashioned
way
#----------------------------------------------------------------
block
return-rst in log quick on ed0 proto tcp from any to any
block
return-icmp-as-dest(port-unr) in log quick on ed0 proto udp from any to
any
block in log quick on ed0
all
#################################################################
#
Inside
Interface
#################################################################
#----------------------------------------------------------------
#
Allow out all TCP, UDP, and ICMP traffic & keep
state
#----------------------------------------------------------------
pass out quick on ed1 proto tcp from any to any keep state
pass out quick on ed1 proto udp from any to any keep state
pass out quick on ed1 proto icmp from any to any keep state
block out quick on ed1 all
#----------------------------------------------------------------
#
Allow in all TCP, UDP, and ICMP traffic & keep
state
#----------------------------------------------------------------
pass in quick on ed1 proto tcp from any to any keep state
pass in quick on ed1 proto udp from any to any keep state
pass in quick on ed1 proto icmp from any to any keep state
block in quick on ed1 all
map ed0 192.168.1.0/24 -> 0/32
cd /usr/src/sys/i386/conf
cp GENERIC FIREWALL
options IPFILTER
options
IPFILTER_LOG
options IPFILTER_DEFAULT_BLOCK options VESA
device ed1 at isa? port 0x280
irq 10 iomem 0xd8000
[root@numa conf]# /usr/sbin/config
-g FIREWALL
[root@numa conf]# cd ../../compile/FIREWALL
[root@numa
FIREWALL]# make depend
[root@numa FIREWALL]# make
[root@numa
FIREWALL]# make install
- Modify the line that reads 'kern_securelevel_enable="NO"' and change the value to "YES"
- Add a line beneath it that reads 'kern_securelevel="2"'
/ ufs rw 1 1
Modify the /etc/fstab file so that it reads as follows:
/tmp ufs rw 2 2
/usr ufs rw 2 2
/usr/home ufs rw 2 2
/usr/local ufs rw 2 2
/var ufs rw 2 2
/ ufs rw,nosuid 1 1
Note that this will make adding new software, etc. much more difficult since
/usr and /usr/local are mounted read-only. This means that programs which
try to install their user-land programs in /usr/local/bin will fail during
their install programs. And cvsup...which will try to update the kernel's
source code in /usr/src and the ports in /usr/ports...well, they're now
read-only because they fall under /usr.
/tmp ufs rw,noexec,nosuid 2 2
/usr ufs ro 2 2
/usr/home ufs rw,noexec,nosuid 2 2
/usr/local ufs ro,nosuid 2 2
/var ufs rw,noexec,nosuid 2 2
If you want to add new software
or upgrade the kernel & ports tree source code, you'll need to
A pain, I know, but this is your firewall, not a desktop workstation. This
is the price you pay for a VERY, VERY secure machine. If you want an
even more secure machine than this, then you can start setting the
immutable flag on files in the filesystem by using the
chflags command with the schg flag...but I won't cover that in this howto.
[root@numa /etc]# shutdown -r now
Hit [Enter] to boot immediately,
or any other key for command prompt.
Booting [kernel] in 9 seconds...
Questions or Comments? E-mail: Marty
Schlacter